Demonstrative Evidence and Expert Opinion by Ladd, Mason
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1956 Issue 1 
January 1956 
Demonstrative Evidence and Expert Opinion 
Mason Ladd 
University of Iowa College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mason Ladd, Demonstrative Evidence and Expert Opinion, 1956 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1956). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1956 February 1956 Number 1
DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE AND
EXPERT OPINION
MASON LADDt
Demonstrative evidence has become the fashion of today in the trial
of cases. The subject has reached epidemic proportions, and modern
trials include this magic method of persuasion as one of the best
gadgets yet devised to obtain jury verdicts and to aid the court in
understanding the full meaning of factual and scientific evidence. The
emphasis upon demonstrative evidence is a part of the times even
though it has been used in one form or another as long as there have
been court trials.
Even in biblical times Solomon the Wise resorted to demonstrative
evidence when called upon to decide which of two women was the
mother of an infant child. When he proposed to cut the child in half
and give half to each, the human instinct of thfe true mother readily
demonstrated the one to whom the child belonged, for she asked that
the other woman be given the child.
People are pictorial-minded today. With television in almost every
home, color pictures covering the pages of almost every magazine as a
part of advertising or as illustration for articles, with the use of dia-
grams and graphs to explain the news and economic trends, and with
a blackboard in every classroom of our schools, it is not surprising
that similar devices have become commonly employed to make the
triers of fact better understand the meaning of testimony and thus
to aid in the determination of the controverted issues of a lawsuit.
The use of charts and other visual aids as a teaching procedure by the
armed forces has added its part to the new look in the presentation of
evidence and testimony. With everyone else making use of pictorial
and other visual aids in the development of ideas, why shouldn't
lawyers make greater use of demonstrative evidence in the prepara-
tion and presentation of proof so that jurors drawn from a visual-
minded public will be able to understand the problems they are to
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
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decide and to evaluate more accurately the testimony of witnesses who
are sometimes not too articulate in relating the facts which they have
perceived or in expressing opinions which they have formed and are
authorized to make.
The use of the many new devices and techniques employed in trials
today may be looked upon critically by some because of the chance of
abuse and unfair practice.' The fact that demonstrative evidence may
make a strong impression upon the triers of fact which may prejudice
the adverse party is not a ground for objecting to it if the evidence
offered is relevant to the issue in dispute and serves a useful purpose
in helping the judge or jury understand the facts as they are.2 There
is no older form of evidence-than real evidence, and the subject is
given extensive treatment in the earlier digests and treatises., In
damage suits for breach of a contract where merchandise was sold by
sample it has always been the common practice to introduce in evi-
dence the sample and a representative portion of the goods delivered
under the sale so that the jury can decide by observation and com-
parison whether the merchandise furnished corresponds with the
sample.4 In a paternity proceeding to determine who is the father of an
illegitimate child it is not uncommon to exhibit the child to the jurors
so that they can compare his appearance with the appearance of the
alleged father, if the child is mature enough to have developed physical
characteristics which disclose a hereditary resemblance5 For the
purpose of identifying an accused person as the one who committed
the crime, he may be asked to stand up in the courtroom, to try on
wearing apparel to see whether it fits, or to do other acts to enable the
jury to determine whether prosecuting witnesses are correct in their
identification.6 It is an old story that in a personal injury suit the
1. Bunge, Demonstrative Evidence-A Grandstand Play? 42 ILL. B.J. 72
(1953); Dooley, Demonstrative Evidence-Nothing New, 42 ILL. B.J. 136 1953);
Hinshaw, Use and Abuse of Demonstrative Evidence: The Art of Jury Persua-
sion, 40 A.B.A.J. 479 (1954).
2. State v. Beckwith, 243 Iowa 841, 53 N.W.2d 867 (1952); State v. Wieners,
66 Mo. 13 (1877) (Where bones of deceased were admitted as evidence, the court
held a party cannot, upon the ground that it may harrow up feelings of indigna-
tion against him in the breasts of the jury, have competent evidence excluded
from its consideration.).
3. THAYER, PRELIINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 277-313
(1898); 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 13-15 (15th ed. 1892); 1 BENTHAMI, RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 401-05 (1827).
4. St. Louis Paper-Box Co. v. J. C. Hubinger Bros. Co., 100 Fed. 595 (2d Cir.
1900).
5. State ex rel. Feagins v. Conn, 160 Kan. 370, 162 P.2d 76 (1945).
6. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Richardson v. State, 168 Miss.
788, 151 So. 910 (1934) ; State v. Bazemore, 193 N.C. 336, 137 S.E. 172 (1927).
The Missouri Constitution provides in Article I, Section 19 that "no person
shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause .... 1" This pro-
vision has not been construed as being limited to compulsory testimonial disclosure;
rather, the court has stated that it also prohibits any disclosure in which the ac-
cused is compelled to participate, such as compulsory furnishing of clues. State v.
Sexton, 147 Mo. 89, 48 S.W. 452 (1898). In this case the accused gave his shoes
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plaintiff's attorney asked the party-witness to show the jury how high
he could raise his arm since the accident occurred. The witness there-
upon raised his arm some distance below the height of his shoulder,
but when opposing counsel on cross-examination asked the witness to
show how high he could raise his arm before the accident the witness
raised his arm high above his head. In the case of Woodward & Lo-
throp v. Heed,7 the plaintiff sued a department store for breach of an
implied warranty in the sale of a muskrat fur coat. She complained
that the fur had worn off around the neck, down the front, and at the
ends of the sleeves; the defendant contended that the fur had not worn
off, but merely had become matted down and needed brushing. In the
trial for the return of the purchase price, the defendant produced two
expeit witnesses who were fur buyers who testified that the fur was
matted down but was not worn off. The plaintiff introduced the coat
itself in evidence. The defendant urged that the failure to meet expert
testimony with evidence of a like character entitled him to a directed
verdict. The case, however, was submitted to the jury which, from its
own inspection of the coat and the testimony of the plaintiff, returned
a verdict in plaintiff's favor. In affirming the case on appeal the court
quoted from the North Dakota decision of Reid v. Ehr in which the
court said "the physical facts speak louder than the testimony of the
experts.... The jury must have disbelieved the testimony of the ex-
perts, and this they did have a right to do. . .. ,,3 This case was of a
kind in which expert testimony was admissible to assist the jury, but
a decision of fact was not dependent upon it. The case is illustrative
of the many instances where the thing itself is the subject of legal
inquiry and is regularly admitted as real evidence for its evidential
value." The almost endless number of exhibits constantly used in the
to the shei iff voluntarily, and they were matched against footprints found at the
scene of the crime. The evidence was held admissible since the accused's action
was voluntary. In State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657, 663, 153 S.W. 1051, 1053 (1913),
the court stated that evidence obtained in a physical examination to which an
accused did not consent would be inadmissible. Although there is strong languagein the Missouri cases which exclude compelled evidence that is not testimonial in
character, it is doubted that the Missouri Supreme Court would follow their rulingin all situations. To do so would eliminate much fingerprint testimony and otherdemonstrative evidence regularly used in courts elsewhere. Both the MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE rule 205 (1942) and the UNIFORM RULES or EvIDENCE rules 23-25 take
positions squarely opposed to at least the dictum statements of the Missouri court.
See 8 WItMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250-52, 2265 (3d ed. 1940). For extensive discus-
sion of this problem, see INBAU, SELF INCREIINATION-WHAT CAN AN AccusED
PERSON BE COMPELLED TO Do? (1950); Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects
of the Blood Tct to Determine Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REV. 191 (1939).
7. 44 A.2d 369 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1945).
8. 43 N.i. 109, 112, 174 N.W. 71, 72 (1919).
9. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *635 (1847) (exhibition of a rupture as adefense in a prosecution for rape) ; State v. Phillips, 212 Iowa 1332, 236 N.W. 104(1931) (production of whiskey bottles and their contents to be looked at, smelled,
and tasted by the jurors); People v. Herk, 179 Misc. 450, 39 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup.Ct. 1942) (viewing of an allegedly lewd show by court and jury); Gabarsky v.
Simkin, 36 Misc. 195, 73 N.Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1901) (exhibition to show age).
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trial of cases, including weapons, clothing, stolen property found in
the possession of the accused, photographs, plats, maps, diagrams,
charts, models, handwriting and fingerprints (with their standards
for comparison), and documentary evidence, along with the right to
view the premises in cases where observation by the triers of fact
serves as an aid to the understanding and decision of the issues, indi-
cates clearly that there is nothing novel in the use of real evidence,
although with the progress of science and the improvement of the
processes for obtaining demonstrative evidence there are many new
methods of utilizing the old and accepted rules of evidence. There is
surely nothing startling about the provisions of the Model Code of
Evidence or the Uniform Rules of Evidence in providing for the ad-
missibility of models, plats, and other demonstrative evidence. 10
Much demonstrative evidence has no relationship to expert testi-
mony, but a large amount of it is used to explain the basis of the
expert's opinion and to enable the jury to understand scientific matter
otherwise difficult to comprehend or evaluate. There is much criticism
of medical experts because of their use of technical language and
their inability to translate their thinking into language which the
jury can understand. The use of a model, a picture, a diagram, or an
X-ray film presented in such a manner that the jury may visualize
the thing about which the expert is testifying will often enable the
jurors to understand so that they may draw their own conclusion
in accordance with the opinions expressed by the experts. It is the
function of the jury to make the decisions upon the ultimate questions
of fact raised by the legal issues of the case. The forward-looking
view of the law of evidence permits the expert to express his opinion
upon the same ultimate issues, but the jury is not compelled to accept
the expert's view upon the ultimate facts in issue.1 ' The blind ac-
ceptance of a conclusion simply because an expert with profound
learning and exceptional qualifications has expressed it is both un-
likely and unexpected in our system of trials. The basic justification
for the departure from the earlier rule which denied experts the right
to express their opinion upon ultimate facts is that although the ex-
pert may express such an opinion the jury is not compelled to follow
it and must, furthermore, rely upon its own determination of the final
conclusions to be drawn. The jurors might conclude that the expert
10. The MODEL CODE Op EVIDENCE rule 105 (j) (1942) provides for the use of
models and for other understandable means of communication to demonstrate
evidence given in the trial. The UNiFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 1(2) assumes
that such use may be made by its definition of relevant evidence.
11. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Francis 148 F.2d 590 (8th Cir.
1945) ; Cropper v. Titanium Pigment Co., 47 F.2d 1038 ?8th Cir. 1931) ; Grismore
V. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942); Annot., 78
A.L.R. 755 (1932); MODEL CODE OF EViDENcE rule 401(1) (1942) ; UNIFORM RuLEs
OF Evm cE rule 56(4).
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has had years of training in the subject, that he is thoroughly familiar
with the basic facts, and that therefore his opinion should become
their own opinion even though they do not understand the reasoning
which led the expert to his conclusion. It is not believed that juries
generally decide cases this way, although there is no way to know just
what causes jurors to reach a decision. Competent attorneys use great
care in qualifying expert witnesses, not only to establish their com-
petency as experts but also to impress the jury with the reliability of
their opinions. This is an important part of the technique of trial.
Nevertheless, however respectful the jurors may be of the capability
of the expert, his testimony will have but little convincing force if they
are not able to understand and accept the reasoning which led him to
the conclusions expressed. The greatest difficulty arises when experts
having substantially equal qualifications express conflicting opinions.
Then opinions alone accomplish little and the triers of fact must be
made to understand the reasoning of the expert and its application to
the precise issue to be decided.
In many cases, demonstrative proof may be essential to enable the
expert to express his opinion. This is true where X-ray films are used
or in the case of fingerprint and handwriting testimony. There are
other cases, however, in which the testimony could be totally verbal or
could be implemented by the use of models, drawings, and illustrations
which would visually show to the jury those facts which would escape
its understanding when told by words alone.
The use of demonstrative evidence may help eliminate the ineffec-
tiveness of expert opinion presented through elongated hypothetical
questions which are often hard for the attorneys to state, for the wit-
nesses to understand, and for the jury to use. The hypothetical ques-
tion is undoubtedly necessary where experts are used who have no per-
sonal knowledge of the facts about which expert opinion is to be ex-
pressed." In such situations the expert's opinion is tested by counter-
questions either eliminating some of the assumed facts when their
existence is questioned, or by assuming different facts from the evi-
dence which is in conflict, or by the inclusion of additional facts which
would change the opinion based upon the hypothetical assumptions.
The linguistic ritual employed in obtaining expert opinion through
hypothetical questions does not provide a realistic way to help the
triers of fact to obtain an understanding necessary for a proper solu-
tion of the issues. There is a rather strong effort upon the part of at-
torneys to get away from extensive use of the hypothetical question
when the expert has personal knowledge of the facts upon which his
12. De Donato v. Wells, 328 Mo. 448, 41 S.W.2d 184 (1931); 2 WGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 676-78 (3d ed. 1940); ROGERS, EXPERT TESTIMONY § 48 (3d ed. 1941);
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 425-27 (1952).
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opinion is expressed. While under our present system of using expert
testimony the hypothetical question may be necessary, the substitution
of demonstrative evidence may provide a solution in many cases which
will enable the jury to understand intelligently the validity of the ex-
pert's opinion. The ingenuity of the lawyers and the experts in creat-
ing devices through which expert opinion may be better uinderstood
may be a costly procedure in the preparation for trial, but efforts to-
ward a greater use of demonstrative evidence should bear fruit in the
results of fact-finding decisions.
SCOPE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY-How CHALLENGED
There are many factual situations arising in trials in which the
line for determining whether expert testimony may or may not be
used is very narrow. While expressed in varying terminology, the sub-
stance of the test for determining when experts may be used is the
common-sense inquiry whether untrained laymen would be qualified
to determine intelligently and to the highest possible degree the par-
ticular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized
understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.13 An interesting
illustration of this problem is found in the cases in which highway
patrolmen, who have gone to schools to study traffic accidents and have
had a great deal of experience in the observation of accidents and
determination of their causes based on a knowledge of the physical
facts, are offered as expert witnesses. 'Any juror is able to draw
inferences from the facts and formulate an idea as to how an accident
occurred, and different deductions from the facts may be presented
in argument by counsel. Nevertheless there is a tendency in this and
similar areas to admit the testimony of specially qualified persons,
and to allow them to express their opinion upon these matters as an
aid to the jury for its better determination of the ultimate issues.
A recent Missouri case held that an experienced patrolman could
not give his opinion as to the point of impact of two cars based upon
his observation of the vehicles and the debris which had fallen from
the cars as a result of the crash.14 The officer had related the facts
showing the location of the debris, but it was held that the evidential
value of the location of the debris falling from the two vehicles was a
matter for the jury to determine and was not a proper subject for
expert testimony. The reason given was that such opinion evidence
invaded the province of the jury and was therefore incompetent.
In a Minnesota case, a deputy sheriff who had investigated many
automobile accidents was asked to express his opinion as to the place
13. Manhattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1934); United States
Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 Fed. 407 (8th Cir. 1909).
14. Hamre v. Conger, 357 Mo. 497, 209 S.W.2d 242 (1948).
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of impact, based upon his observations of the tracks of the cars and
the position of the automobiles after the accident.'5 Objection was
urged on the ground that the question called for the conclusion of the
witness based on speculation and conjecture, and that it invaded the
province of the jury. The objection was overruled, and the opinion
was expressed that the accident had happened in the northern half of
the highway. The officer also was permitted to demonstrate with the
use of model cars his explanation of how the accident occurred. On
appeal the case was reversed. After reviewing many cases, the court
considered the evidence given by the officer as not a proper subject for
expert opinion and as having sufficient weight with the jury to be a
determining factor in bringing about the verdict. A California ap-
peals court reached a contrary conclusion when a traffic officer who
had investigated accidents for many years was permitted to express
his opinion as to the place of impact of colliding cars coming in op-
posite directions after he had related the facts, based upon personal
observation, showing the position of the cars and their appearance
when he arrived at the scene of the accident about five minutes after
it had occurred.'c In another Minnesota case expert testimony was
admitted where evidence of lay witnesses was in conflict as to whether
the defendant's truck was standing still at the time of the accident. 17
Photographs were introduced as demonstrative evidence showing the
condition of the vehicles. An expert witness, who was a mechanic
and had supervised the repair of wrecked automobiles for a long
period of time, was permitted to express his opinion that the truck
involved in the collision was standing still at the time of impact be-
cause of the absence of side-swipe marks upon it. He reasoned that if
the truck had been moving any impact would have extended laterally
along the side of the truck. It would seem that this testimony required
no greater scientific knowledge than is needed in the case in which the
location of the cars involved in an accident is determined from the
position of the debris.
A most interesting decision upon this subject is the federal case of
Een ?.' Consolidated Freightways.18 A deputy sheriff with seventeen
years of experience in investigating accidents as a law enforcement
officer arrived at the scene of an accident an hour after its occurrence,
but before the damaged vehicles had been moved from the position in
which they had come to rest after the impact. Defense counsel, after
laying a foundation showing the sheriff's experience and personal
observations from the scene of the accident, asked the officer if he had
15. Beckman v. Schroeder, 224 Minn. 370, 28 N.W.2d 629 (1947).
16. Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines Inc., 104 Cal. App. 2d 716, 232 P.2d
572 (1951).
17. Woyak v. Konieske, 237 Minn. 213, 54 N.W.2d 649 (1952).
18. 120 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954).
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formed an opinion as to where the impact had occurred. Upon answer-
ing in the affirmative, he was then asked to express his opinion. The
plaintiff's counsel objected on the grounds that the question was
"incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, calling for speculation,
guess and conjecture, invading the province of the jury and called for
a conclusion."'" The objection was overruled, and the officer was per-
mitted to give his opinion that the accident had happened in the left
lane of traffic. Judge Vogel of the United States District Court for
North Dakota, in an ably written opinion, discussed at length the
question of whether the point of collision upon a highway is properly
the subject of expert testimony by a witness who personally observed
the scene of the collision after its occurrence. In the case, counsel had
urged conflicting inferences from the same physical facts, and also
had contended that the jury was as capable of drawing the inference
as the expert. The court stated:
It would seem, therefore, that this is not a case where the con-
clusion as to where the collision occurred is so obvious that any
reasonable person, trained or not, could easily draw the inference.
Rather, it would seem to be a case where trained experts in the
field would be of considerable assistance to the jurors in arriving
at their conclusions.
Modern legal thinking indicates quite clearly that the rule ex-
cluding opinion evidence is to be applied sparingly, if at all, so
that the jury may have all evidence that may aid them in their
determination of the facts.20
The court took the view that although the jurors might be able to
draw inferences from the facts presented in evidence and were ulti-
mately required to do so, nevertheless a witness having extensive
experience in observing similar occurrences ought to be able to ex-
press his opinion upon the facts for whatever aid it might be to the
jurors in formulating their own conclusions.
On appeal to the circuit court another interesting and informative
opinion was written affirming the decision.21 It is sometimes said,
whether accurately or not, that when an appellate court is reluctant
to consider a problem and yet is satisfied with the conclusions reached,
the court may search for some other means of resolving the issue.
Whether that observation is applicable here or whether the opinion
reflects the astuteness of a irery able judge, Chief Judge Gardener
resolved the appeal by holding that a proper specific objection had not
been urged by plaintiff's counsel to raise the issue.
This opinion is important upon the question of proper trial tech-
niques in raising the issue of whether a matter is within the scope of
19. Id. at 291.
20. Id. at 293.
21. Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 220 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1955),
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expert testimony. The objection urged in the trial court, as quoted pre-
viously, was sufficient to cause the trial court to know that counsel had
challenged the question as raising matter not subject to expert testi-
mony, for otherwise the trial judge would not have written the opinion
which he did. Counsel asserted that the question called for the con-
clusion of the witness, and that it invaded the province of the jury.
He further claimed that the question asked would result in specula-
tion, guess, and conjecture. He threw in for good measure the general
objection that the question called for incompetent, irrelevant, and im-
material evidence. This objection was sufficient to enable the trial
judge to see what the issue was, and he proceeded to consider the ques-
tion of whether expert testimony could be given upon the subject of
the point of impact from the position of the cars after the accident.
Did such opinion invade the province of the jury? Did the question
call for an opinion on a factual issue upon which the jury alone could
draw the inferences? Whether the language of the objection as urged
raised this issue or not, it awakened the trial judge to the problem and
he proceeded to decide it on that ground. On appeal, however, with
technical refinement, and observing the well-established rule that for
review upon appeal counsel must have made the proper specific ob-
jection in the trial court, the Chief Judge held that the objections
which were urged were without merit. He stated:
No question is raised as to the qualification of the witness.
Neither is any question raised by the objection that the question
propounded was not a proper subject for expert testimony.
It is essential to a review of a ruling on the admissibility of
evidence that a specific objection be made in the trial court
sharply calling the ground relied upon to the attention of the
court and on appeal the objection interposed must be relied upon.
Quite aside from this, however, we are of the view that on the
state of the evidence in the record the verdict of the jury was
clearly correct.22
While the appeal opinion in the Een case may appear to be overly tech-
nical, it is perhaps logically sound and serves as a warning for at-
torneys to use great care in urging the proper objection to a question
calling for the opinion of a witness when it is claimed that the matter
in inquiry is not a proper subject for expert testimony. Just what
should this objection be? It would appear not to be that the witness
has not qualified as an expert, because in many instances the witness
will be highly qualified as an expert. He might be an engineer with
many years of experience and training in the type of subject matter
22. Id. at 87-88.
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in issue. Some highway patrolmen attend traffic schools and have had
an abundance of experience which should enable them to have much
more knowledge and understanding of the subject matter involved
than the ordinary person. While it is always necessary to give founda-
tion testimony qualifying the expert, there was no absence of this in
the Een case. The proper objection to raise the issue is simply that
the subject matter of the question was not a proper subject nor
within the scope of expert testimony. This surely would be a suffi-
ciently specific objection. However, to play safe in view of the opinion
in the Een case, it might be well to add that neither this witness nor
any other witness could qualify as an expert upon the subject matter
involved.
It would have been interesting to see what the court of appeals
would have done had these specific objections been urged. The court
would have had to decide the real' problem in the case. The court might
have said it was error without prejudice, but that would have been
contrary to the Minnesota case where the trial court's admission of
expert testimony on this subject was reversed because such proof
could have had great weight with the jury.2 3 What the decision would
have been is of course speculative, but it may be that the decision
upon the technical issue relating to the specific objection permitted
the appellate court to uphold the admission of evidence otherwise re-
garded as proper.
The areas in which there is a close question of whether expert opin-
ion along with demonstrative evidence may be used to assist the jurors
in drawing conclusions which they otherwise could make themselves
extend into the whole field of tort liability.4 The tendency in the past
has been to exclude expert opinion, and to let physical facts and de-
monstrative proofs speak for themselves. Gradually, with improve-
ment of objective aids and the growth of scientific understanding, this
tendency is in the process of change. Whereas far greater use is now
being made of demonstrative evidence in tort cases, the expansion of
expert testimony in respect to demonstrative evidence has moved at a
slower pace. Its future depends upon the degree to which specially
trained and experienced persons can reliably give additional light so
as to enable the jury to evaluate more accurately the significance of
facts.
USE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE--COMPARISON AND INTERPRETATION
Much demonstrative evidence used in connection with expert testi-
mony is for purposes of comparison and interpretation. This is most
23. See note 17 supra.
24. Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence Issues,
26 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1947).
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commonly used in the identification cases involving fingerprints,2
moulage castings,2- and ballistics,. 7 and in the forgery cases involving
handwriting.5 The pattern for the introduction of exhibits and for
questioning of the experts in all of these cases is much the same.
Through known exhibits representing standards of comparison, ques-
tioned writings or imprints are examined for the purpose of identifi-
cation of the two as the same or to distinguish them if not the same.
Often photography plays an important part in this type of evidence,
and through a process of enlargement the identifying elements are
made more apparent to the triers of fact who can see for themselves
the basis of the experts' opinion and formulate an opinion of their own
in accord with it. Effective use of this type of evidence involves skill
in obtaining and processing the exhibits, careful technique upon the
part of counsel in their introduction, and clarity of the expert witness
in pointing out the elements which form the basis of his opinion. The
principles of law affecting the use of this type of testimony are pretty
well settled, but the techniques and methods of using the law have
progressed rapidly with the development of science.
Often, the question of the use of these exhibits involves the problem
of expressing an opinion in the terms of the ultimate fact. In the
fingerprint cases the ultimate issue for the jury to decide is the iden-
tity of the person. In the forgery cases the controversy is whether a
questioned writing was or was not written by the defendant. In an
Iowa case the trial court was reversed because the witness was per-
mitted to testify that the two fingerprints were the prints of the same
person.-^' It was held that this was an issue to be decided by the jury
and that a more roundabout method should have been used to question
the expert witness. Just what this method should have been is hard to
determine because the ultimate issue and the subject matter of expert
testimony were identical. A question could perhaps have been more
adroitly put through hypothetical formulation asking indefinitely the
question as to whether fingerprints generally similar to those indicated
by the two exhibits would have been made by the same person, and if
25. In a criminal case photographs of fingerprints found at the scene of the
crime are admissible in evidence for comparison with the fingerprints of the
accused or with enlarged photographs of his fingerprints. Duree v. United States,
297 Fed. 70 (8th Cir. 1924); State v. Richetti, 342 Mo. 1015, 119 S.W.2d 330
(1938)
26. Nebergall, Mordage, in ELEMENTS OF POuICe SCIExc c. VII (Perkins ed.
1942).
27. State v. Campbell, 213 Iowa 677, 239 N.W. 715 (1931) (expert witness used
photographs of two bullets to explain his conclusion that they had been fired from
the same gun). 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 410-11, 417a (3d ed. 1940).
28. "By suitable photographs the genuineness or spuriousness of handwriting
alleged to have been forged and the authorship of anonymous handwriting often
can be demonstrated conclusively to judge and jury." SCOTT, PHOTOGSAPHIc EvI-
DENCB S 401 (1942).
29. State v. Steffen, 210 Iowa 196, 230 N.W. 536 (1930).
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an affirmative answer had been given then the jury could have in-
ferred the conclusion which was given by the witness.
The Iowa court later expressly overruled this opinion"0 and many
others like it by saying that there was no objection to allowing an
expert witness to express his opinion upon an ultimate fact, because
the jurors are at liberty to accept or reject the expert opinion. These
two cases point up the importance of skill in questioning a witness
upon comparative evidence. The opinion would mean very little, either
on the point of identity or difference, were it not brought home to the
triers of fact so that they could see with their own eyes the common
points of identity in the two exhibits being compared which caused the
expert to arrive at his conclusion. The statement "seeing is believing"
is never more true than in the courtroom where demonstrative evi-
dence is used. In the fingerprint cases, by use of enlarged photographs
of the print the expert points out the various features of the papillary
ridges showing abrupt endings, bifurcations, islands, dots, whirls, and
other characteristics setting in the same relationship to each other on
the questioned print as on the standard of comparison. In this way the
jurors can say that the opinion of the expert is their opinion also, not
just because he expressed it, but because he demonstrated it to them.
Indeed, fingerprint testimony, if the questioned print is reasonably
clear, could almost be regarded as a statement of the fact of identity
rather than mere opinion.3 1
The use of moulage castings has almost the same force as finger-
print testimony because when they are enlarged through photography
the identifying characteristics reveal themselves with a clarity which
gives almost complete understanding without need of opinion, al-
though of course the opinion is expressed.32 The same is true in the
matching of wood, such as in the Lindbergh kidnapping case where
the splintered ends of a broken board fitted together so perfectly that
there was no question but that the two pieces were a part of one
board.33 The use of ballistics is a scientific development by which the
imperfections and variations in the barrel of a firearm that become
engrained in the softer substance of the bullet as it is discharged from
the weapon can be observed. It may be said that each firearm has a
"personality" all its own. With the development of the science of
photography the grooves or markings upon a bullet become apparent
and afford the basis of an inference that the bullet in question came
from the same barrel as that from which the standard for comparison
30. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 362, 5 N.W.2d 646,
663 (1942).
31. See People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911); State v. Kuhl,
42 Nev. 185. 175 Pac. 190 (1918); UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVDEnNCE §§ 870-73
(4th ed. 1935).
32. See note 26 supra.
33. State v. Hauptman, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 Atl. 809 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
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was fired., Comparative typewriting involves the same principle25
Experts simply aid the jury in seeing what is already there, usually
accompanied by an opinion expressing the result of their observations.
While the characteristics of handwriting may be less pronounced
in some cases than in the types of comparative evidence mentioned
above, the process of proof and demonstration is much the same.
Photographic enlargements bring out the characteristics of forged
writing and show the fuzzy edges, the hesitations, and the irregulari-
ties of tracing. Expertness in handwriting has become highly de-
veloped, but still has not received the judicial recognition which might
properly be accorded to it." The success of the handwriting expert
therefore is dependent upon the degree to which the expert can demon-
strate the correctness of the conclusion by pointing out upon the
exhibits being compared the peculiarities in the formulation of letters,
the spacing between them, the slant of the writing, and other dis-
tinguishing observations. The opinion of the handwriting expert and
its influence upon a jury is believed to be negligible when compared
to the effect of pointing out to the jury the things taken into account
as indicated upon demonstrative exhibits through which the expert
has formed his opinion.
The use of an X-ray film or a skiagram affords the best illustration
of interpretation as distinguished from comparison. The film is the
very basis upon which the expert makes a diagnosis or prognosis. It is
technically not a picture, but is a record of the penetration of the rays
which discloses the densities and soft substances. The light portions
of the film show the absence of penetration and the darker portions or
shadows record the varying degrees of completeness of the penetra-
tion, Thus, for example, if there has been a complete union of a bone
fracture, there will be little, if any, variation in the light area of the
bone structure, but if the union is not complete, the X-ray will pene-
trate through the unsolid portion and will appear as a shadow on the
34. State v. Campbell, 213 Iowa 677, 239 N.W. 715 (1931).35. State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447 (1906) (competent for an
expert to testify that a comparison of the letters, defendant's typewritten affida-
vits, and the work done on a certain machine indicated, because of defects in
type, alignment, and spacing, that the letters and affidavits were written on the
machine in question). In People v. Storrs, 207 N.Y. 147, 154, 100 N.E. 730, 732(1912), the court of aypeals said,
Inaqmuch as its work affords the readiest means of identification, no valid
reason is perceived why admitted or established samples of that work should
not be received in evidence for purposes of comparison with other type-
written matter alleged to have been produced upon the same machine.
See also OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENT PROBLEMS c. XVIH (4th ed. 1944).
3S. OSBORN, QUEsTIONED DOCUMENT PROBLEMS C. XLIV (4th ed. 1944). On the
value of opinion testimony of handwriting experts that a document is not genuine
onpo ed to testimony of persons claiming to be attesting witnesses, see Young
Estate, 347 Pa. 457. 2 A.2d 901, 154 A.L.R. 643 (1943). See also Note, Instruc-
tion to the Jury Where Handwriting Is Identified by Expert Testimony, 7 IowA
L. BULT. 55 (1922).
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film. The variation between light and shadows may be comparatively
slight but may still have significant meaning to the medical expert.
Therefore the use of an X-ray film for demonstrative purposes must be
accompanied by the testimony of an expert. It is ordinarily worthless
without expert testimony. However, in one case which involved the
question of the curvature of the spine the court took the position that
the film exhibit spoke for itself and questioned the need of expert opin-
ion.3" The interpretation of a skiagram is not so obvious, and expert
opinion is not only admissible but is required for interpretation."8 In
order to show the existence of severity of a fracture shortly after its
occurrence, the X-ray film as demonstrative evidence is perhaps more
effective than any other type of proof because the broken portions of
the bone stand in a clear relief which a jury may easily understand
and consider in determining the amount of damages. The use of a
skiagram with the light back of it to make the exposures apparent en-
ables the jury to see visually the various factors upon which the expert
bases his opinion. While the jurors must rely upon the opinion of the
expert as to what significance they may give to varying degrees of
lights and shadows, their visual observation is an influential factor in
evaluating the opinion of the expert. There may be a photographic
reproduction of an X-ray film but this is less satisfactory as a means
of demonstrative presentation. Also it is possible to make a slide
through photographing the X-ray film for projection of the film on a
screen. The film itself is ordinarily better for interpretative purposes
because much detail is often lost in other reproductions. It is desirable
ordinarily to have several films representing the different angles of
exposures in order to get the true exhibition of the condition of a pa-
tient. The introduction of X-ray films and the interpretation of them
should be a slow, careful process in the trial of a case. After qualifi-
cation of the expert, foundation testimony showing what an X-ray is
and what it does should be given by the expert. The film must be con-
nected through proper identification so as to leave no doubt that it be-
longs to the right party. The film exhibit is offered in evidence as are
other exhibits. While there is nothing unique about the use of X-ray
films and expert opinion explaining them, it affords one of the best
examples of the use of demonstrative interpretative evidence.
PHOTOGRAPHS, MODELS, AND BLACKBOARDS
The trial of a damage suit, whether it be for injury to person or
destruction of property, is hardly complete today without an abun-
dance of photographs. Mr. Hinshaw, in an article in the American Bar
37. Lang v. Marshalltown Light, Power & Ry. Co., 185 Iowa 940, 170 N.W. 468(1919).
38. Appleby v. Cass, 211 Iowa 1145, 234 N.W. 477 (1931). See SCOTT, PHOTO-
GRAPHIc EViDENCE § 804 (1942); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 795 (3d ed.'1940).
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Association Journal, suggests the possible use of as many as twelve
copies of each photograph so that each of the jurors may have a copy
of the exhibit to examine during argument of counsel39 All treatises
on the subject of evidence deal with the subject of photographs, and
the ably-prepared book by Charles C. Scott4' on photographic evidence
along with the emphasis upon the subject in Melvin M. Belli's Modern
Trials"1 indicates the extensive use of pictorial evidence today. The
danger of trick photography to produce the kind of evidence which
will best serve the party offering it has not precluded the use of proper
photography any more than the danger of perjury has prevented
testimonial evidence generally. These dangers are very real, however,
and may give an erroneous indication of distance or size, or produce
other exaggerations which destroy the true representation of the sub-
ject matter of the photograph. In such cases an expert in photography
may be necessary to expose the distortion. Nevertheless, it is not neces-
sary to have an expert in photography for the introduction of photo-
graphic exhibits. A witness having personal knowledge of the object
photographed can testify that the exhibit is a fair and accurate repre-
sentation of what he has seen.4 - Also, there is nothing wrong in the
use of color photographs when they fairly represent the subject photo-
graphed, both as to form and color."' Motion pictures have been less
extensively used, but what could better indicate the sobriety or drunk-
enness of one charged with driving while intoxicated than a motion
picture disclosing his demeanor and conduct shortly after arrest. An
audio-visual presentation of the taking of a confession would likewise
be significant upon the question of whether it was voluntarily made.41
Medical photography has been highly developed for use by doctors,
and it likewise serves a valuable purpose in litigation.45
39. Hinshaw, Use and Abuse of Demonstrative Evidence: The Art of Jury
Persuasion, 40 A.B.A.J. 479, 481 (1954).
40. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE (1942).
41. 2 BELLI, MODEIRN TRIALS (1954).
42. New York, S. & W.R.R. v. Moore, 105 Fed. 725 (2d Cir. 1901); Huntington
Light & Fuel Co. v. Beaver, 37 Ind. App. 4, 73 N.E. 1002 (1905).
43. Green v. Denver, 111 Colo. 390, 142 P.2d 277 (1943) ; State v. Long, 195
Ore. 81,244 P.2d 1033 (1952).
44. Heiman v. Market Street Ry., 21 Cal. App. 2d 311, 69 P.2d 178 (1937)(movie taken of plaintiff admitted to show extent of her injuries); Philippi v.
New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 136 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. App. 1940) (motion pictures
taken of reconstruction of truck-train collision); Commonwealth v. Roller, 13 Pa.
D. & C. 332 (1930), aff'd, 100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930) (talking motion picture
taken of confession of accused in criminal case). See Sweet, The Motion Picture
as a Fraud Detector, 21 A.B.A.J. 653 (1935).
45. See Kent, Medical Photography in a Teaching Hospital, 23 MEDICAL RAM-
OGRAPHY AND PHOTOGRAPHY 13 (1947). Mr. Kent has spent more than twenty-five
years as photographer for the State University of Iowa devoting a large amount
of his time to technical-medical photography. This journal is published by the
Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, New York, and is devoted o photography
as connected with medicine. This publication contains extensive illustrative
material of a scientific character and has very valuable reference material for
the use of scientific photography.
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For the most part, the use of photography in the courts is not ac-
companied by expert opinion. Such testimony depends upon whether
the object photographed and the subject in inquiry concerned the use
of scientific knowledge which will better enable the triers of fact to
understand what would otherwise be less apparent without the use
of an expert.
In the presentation of photographic evidence there are a few princi-
ples essential for admissibility. It must first be shown that the condi-
tion of the object photographed was the same at the time the picture
was taken as it was at the time the events giving rise to the legal ques-
tion occurred, or that at the time the photograph was taken the condi-
tion was then a proper subject of legal inquiry. This really relates to
the problem of relevancy, which is as much present in photographic
evidence as in any other kind of evidence. While it may not be neces-
sary that the person who took the photograph appear as a witness, it is
surely the better practice to call him as a witness. The test of whether
a photograph is a fair and accurate representation and portrays the
actual condition of the object photographed is the basis of admissi-
bility, and this may be established by one who has personal knowledge
of these facts.4 6 Testimony regarding the techniques used in the pho-
tography and development of a film are not necessary for admissibility,
although it may be very important where distortion is charged. The
relationship of photography to expert testimony, other than in chal-
lenging the accuracy of the photograph, simply involves the over-all
question of whether the object photographed involves the subject of
expert testimony.
Models serve a purpose in trials similar to photographs in that they
attempt visual demonstration to supplement testimonial evidence.
They differ, however, in that they are more in the nature of illustra-
tive proof and are used to explain other evidence, while the photo-
graph represents an actual portrayal of a specified object of evidence.
The use of models assists in almost every area of the law in which
physical conditions are involved in expert testimony relating to scien-
tific matters. The engineer, the architect, the chemist, and the medical
expert are making increased use of charts, diagrams, models, skele-
tons, pictures, and exhibits to explain facts, and to demonstrate factors
involved in reaching their opinion. The use of such evidence is un-
limited. In the medical field a carefully drawn anatomical chart may
well illustrate the difference between normal and abnormal conditions,
explain the parts of the body, show the nervous and muscular system,
the bone structure, and their method of function.4 7 The mobility of
46. See cases cited in note 42 supra.
47. State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857). See Lackey v. State, 215 Miss. 57, 60
So. 2d 503 (1952) (anatomical charts used to illustrate medical testimony); Segee
v. Cowan, 66 R.L 445, 20 A.2d 270 (1941) (medical expert testifying in a negli-
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the parts of the body may be demonstrated by models which experts
have established through testimony as being a fair and accurate rep-
resentation of the portions of the body involved in medical testimony.
If the jury can see models of the skeletal structure, it helps far beyond
verbal testimony picturing the same matter. The personal injury
lawyer, whether he represents the plaintiff or defendant, may make
equal use of such demonstrative evidence to explain, tlhrough his ex-
perts, the theory employed in diagnosis or to express an opinion upon
the prognosis. Human skeletons, bone preparations, and illustrative
exhibits are regularly used in the education of medical students, and
the medical expert in the courtroom performs a service analogous to
that of a teacher in explaining enough to the triers of fact that they
may draw their conclusions of cause and effect and the amount of
damages sustained in a personal injury case. The jurors must receive
scientific information regardless of how difficult it may be for them to
understand, if they are to perform with any degree of intelligence the
task of rendering a verdict in these cases. While it may be said that
courts and juries bring about a rough and ready justice, nevertheless
they are called upon to decide scientific issues which they can hardly
be expected to comprehend fully without every effort to produce an un-
derstanding. Demonstrative medical evidence is the best devised an-
swer to provide this information and to make sense out of the too
often learned, technical dissertations given by doctors upon the wit-
ness stand.
The lawyer must also educate himself upon the scientific matters
involved in the factual determination if he is to perform adequately
his service as a lawyer in such cases. Through his education by the
doctors in the case and his reading, he should know all there is to be
known about the scientific issues involved. While the lawyer thus
informed would not be worth much in the treatment of a patient, it
is entirely possible for him to become sufficiently expert in the scien-
tific matter involved in the case so that he may examine a witness with
telling effect. He is the medium through which scientific evidence is
presented by experts, and he must have a detailed understanding if his
job is to be well done.
The exhibition of a person disclosing the character of his injury is
a proper type of demonstrative evidence in many cases, although it is
a subject of much controversy. The question is the extent to which
such exhibition will serve to enable the triers of fact to evaluate better
the evidence and to understand more fully the issues which they are
to decide. Objection is ordinarily raised that the exhibition may enlist
the sympathy of the jury; but if it makes a vital contribution to its
gence action may make an illustrative drawing of a fractured tibia to explain his
testimony). See also 2 BELLU, MODERN TRIALS § 269 (1954).
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understanding, its usefulness should outweigh this danger. Objection
is sometimes urged that such evidence may be indecent, but indecency
depends upon the purpose of the act and should not preclude a court
of justice from admitting the evidence if it serves a worthwhile pur-
pose in the trial. 8
A good deal of controversy has arisen in the legal profession about
the use of blackboards in the courtroom.-" As demonstrative evidence
the blackboard is questionable because it lacks permanency and cannot
be preserved as a part of the record on appeal unless the court em-
ploys the awkward device of continuously photographing or copying
all writings or drawings before erasure is made. Even then, in many
cases the film could not be developed in time to permit photographs of
what was on the blackboard to be taken into the jury room as exhibits.
Diagrams and charts accurately prepared in advance of trial would
serve a much more useful purpose if this material meets the admissi-
bility requirements and is used as demonstrative evidence. To connect
testimony with markings upon a blackboard made by the witness while
testifying would be a difficult task. Even when a plat is used, upon
which markings and locations are made by a witness, great care must
be taken to identify the different markings by letters or numbers so as
to connect up the testimony with the plat. A not too uncommon mis-
take in the technique of trial occurs when attorneys ask witnesses to
make marks upon a plat but do not ask the witness to designate by
symbol the different markings so that there is a proper permanent
identification. Again, by the time opposing counsel uses the same
chart in cross-examination with another set of marks the difficulties
are multiplied. When other witnesses use the same chart with their
markings and symbols, the chart may become a confused mass, useful
to no one." Objection to a blackboard is not because it is novel, but
48. Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 55 N.D. 353, 213 N.W.
841 (1927); Dunkin v. City of Hoquiam, 56 Wash. 47, 105 Pac. 149 (1909). But
of. State v. Stevens, 133 Iowa 684, 110 N.W. 1037 (1907) (on a charge of rape,
the defendant's request to have the jury examine him in a private room was
properly refused); Garvik v. Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 124 Iowa 691, 100 N.W.
498 (1904) (same); 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2180 (3d ed. 1940).
49. Hinshaw, Use and Abuse of Demonstrative Evidence: The Art of JuryPersuasion, 40 A.B.A.J. 479, 542 (1954) ; Dooley, Demonstrative Evidence-:-Noth-
ing New, 42 ILL. B.J. 136, 143 (1953).
50. Sometimes after the attorney for one of the parties has prepared a carefulplat and has used it in presenting the testimony of his witnesses, the opposing
counsel may attempt to use the same plat for his witnesses, and, in so using it,
might make the plat such a jumbled affair that the first party would lose the
benefit of all his original efforts. To prevent this, it is suggested that counsel
initiating the use of a plat should have duplicate copies without markings, and
offer them for use by the opposing counsel. While the matter would rest in the
sound discretion of the trial court, it is reasonable to assume that the court will
require the use of the independent plat to come in as a separate exhibit. The
same situation exists wherever markings are to be made in court upon exhibits
offered in a case. The problems in respect to charts and plats are even greater
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because a better method of preservation of exhibits and means of
offering them in evidence is available.
There is a place, however, for the blackboard in the courtroom for
those who care to use it. In argument by counsel there would appear
to be no real objection to the attorney using a blackboard, and it might
be very effective in presenting his analysis of the evidence. If he can
describe by words there is no reason why he should not illustrate by
drawings. If a drawing is an effective medium of communicating ideas
in argument, there is no justifiable reason to preclude its use.5' Argu-
ments are not ordinarily reported so that writing on a blackboard
made by counsel during argument would not need to be preserved any
more than the spoken word. If there was an objection that the draw-
ing was unfair or inflammatory for some reason, the writing on the
board could be preserved by a similar writing on a paper which could
be made a part of the trial record. In much the same way that the
record of a matter objected to in oral argument is preserved, an ob-
.iection to writings or drawings used by counsel in argument could
be included in the record through use of the court reporter when ob-
jection was made. In opening statements it is possible that a black-
board may assist counsel in showing the jury what he proposes to es-
tablish by proof in the case, but ordinarily it would seem that this type
of communication could be more effectively used at the conclusion of
the case when all the evidence has been presented and when final argu-
ments are given. Many courts have approved the use of a blackboard
in the ways mentioned.52
CONCLUSION
Much has been written upon the use and abuse of demonstrative
evidence.I The subject of expert testimony generally has received its
share of criticism. The M odel Code of Evidence and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence have provided for marked improvement in the use
of opinion testimony.5 4 The hypothetical question often may accom-
with the use of the blackboard. For excellent discussion of techniques, see
Stichter, A Practitioner's Guide to the Use of Exhibits and Expert Testimony, 8
OHmO ST. L.J. 295 (1942).
51. Haley v. Hockey, 199 Misc. 512, 103 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; of. Mur-
ray v. State, 19 Ariz. 49, 165 Pac. 315 (1917).
52. See, e.g., Haley v. Hockey, supra note 51.
53. See note 1 supra; Note, Real Evidence: Use and Abuse, 14 BROOKLYN L.
Rfv. 261 (1948).
54. Both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules greatly liberalize the use of
opinion testimony by lay witnesses by permitting them to give testimony in terms
of inference, thus eliminating the fine line between what is inference and what is
fact. The Model Code permits testimony in terms of inference unless the judge
finds the witness could testify as well through facts and that damaging effects
could result from testimony expressed in terms of opinion. The Uniform Rules
require factual testimony unless the judge finds testimony in terms of inference
or opinion would be helpful to a clearer understanding. Both the Model Code and
the Uniform Rules require the testimony to be based upon the personal perception
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plish more in confusion than in providing understanding. As a means
of communicating scientific matter and opinions in respect to them,
demonstrative evidence provides perhaps the most effective device to
enable the laymen who make up our juries to understand and evaluate
the wide range of expert testimony which they are required to apply
in the innumerable and varied problems which are presented to them
for decision. The present fashion in trials requires a new type of
preparation and presentation of a case, more ingenuity of counsel, and
more expense. Although there is the possibility of abuse by counsel,
this can be prevented by the court, and greater use of demonstrative
evidence should bring about an improvement in the determination of
the rights of the parties.
of the witness and simply liberalize the method of expressing relevant informa-
tion. Both permit testimony as to the ultimate fact whenever opinion is admitted.
They strike a hard blow at rigid traditional limitations which hampered so much
the efforts of a witness to tell his story in court in language which the witness
ordinarily uses. Hypothetical questions are not necessary for questioning the
opinion of the expert unless the judge in his discretion requires them. The expert
with personal knowledge of the facts may express his opinion without first indicat-
ing the factual background but opposing counsel may require specification of the
data upon which the expert relied.
Provision is made in the Model Code and the Uniform Rules for the appointment
of impartial experts by the court where the court determines it desirable. The
parties may suggest a panel of names to the court but the court makes the selec-
on. The experts then study the mater in question and make a written report.
This report is to be read in the courtroom, but the experts are subject to cross-
examination. Parties are pertted to call other experts of their own. Other pro-
visions are made in the Code and in the Rules with respect to adequate fees for
experts. Demonstrative evidence can still be used to illustrate the findings of the
experts when they are examined in court with respect to their written report.
Perhaps the greatest feature of the new proposals as they relate to expert testi-
mony is the effort to eliminate the feeling by the expert that he is an advocate for
the party who calls him and to create in the expert a responsibility to seek out the
truth and to express an objective opinion based on scientific accurateness. See
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE C. V (1942); UNIFORm RuLEs OF EVIDENCE c. VII.
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